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1.57 GW of data centres and a sovereign-cloud push

A PIB backgrounder for ESTIC 2026 set out India's cloud ecosystem - 30 empanelled providers, MeghRaj serving 2,330 departments, 1.57 GW of data centres heading for 8 GW - and the policy turn towards keeping sensitive data on Indian infrastructure; an overview, not a new policy.

What happened

For Prelims

For UPSC: MeghRaj (2014): 2,330 departments; 30 empanelled CSPs; data centres 1.57 GW (to ~8 GW by 2030); IndiaAI Mission Rs 10,371.92 crore, 45,000+ GPUs; Cloud Selection Framework March 2026.
What it is NOT: A backgrounder describes, it does not decide: no new scheme, money or rule is announced. It does not say how much government data still sits on foreign-owned clouds, what share of the 1.57 GW is owned by foreign hyperscalers, or how much electricity and water an 8 GW data centre base would need. The negative list under Section 16 of the DPDP Act has not been notified, so the cross-border rule it cites is not yet operative, and the BHASHINI performance gains are reported, not independently audited.

For Mains

Syllabus: GS3.13 · GS3.12 · Linkage L1

Anchor
Every digital public service - DigiLocker, UPI records, AI models - runs on someone's servers. The backgrounder's argument is that a country producing data at India's scale needs computing it controls, which is why cloud has become a question of sovereignty as well as efficiency.
Substantiation (data)
1,092.79 million internet subscribers; 285,376 PB of wireless data in FY 2025-26; 30 empanelled providers; MeghRaj serving 2,330 departments; 1.57 GW of data centres, projected near 8 GW by 2030; 45,000-plus GPUs under the Rs 10,371.92 crore IndiaAI Mission.
Position
A layered approach is right: sensitive data on NIC and State data centres, the rest on empanelled commercial clouds, governed by the Cloud Selection Framework and the DPDP Act. Sovereignty and efficiency need not conflict if classification is done well.
Counterpoint
Domestic hosting is not domestic technology: much of the stack, chips and software remains foreign, and foreign hyperscalers are among the empanelled providers. Data centres are also heavy users of power and water, which the backgrounder does not address.
Way forward
Notify the DPDP negative list and data-classification rules; publish how much government data has migrated to sovereign clouds; tie data-centre growth to renewable power and water-efficient cooling; and build indigenous software layers alongside physical capacity.
Conclusion
India has the demand, the investment and the frameworks for a domestic cloud. The harder part is making sovereignty mean control over the technology, not only over the building where the servers sit.
Deploys into: Data sovereignty and digital public infrastructure · Data protection and cross-border data flows · AI compute and data centres · Energy demand of digital infrastructure
PIB Backgrounder · 2026-10-29 · PRID 2329978 · PIB source ↗
Related: MeghRaj · IndiaAI Mission · Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 · BHASHINI · National Informatics Centre