PIB TrackerKarachi to Jebel Ali to Nhava Sheva: 25,000 kg of seeds
DRI seized Pakistan-origin watermelon seeds transshipped through Dubai and declared as UAE goods - the third such case in two months under Operation Deep Manifest, after dry dates at Nashik and rock salt routed through Colombo.
What happened
- DRI, under Operation Deep Manifest, intercepted about 25,000 kg of Pakistan-origin watermelon seeds declared as UAE-origin muskmelon seeds at Nhava Sheva; the operation ran 11 September to 22 October 2026 and two persons were arrested on 22 October.
- The route: shipped from Karachi to Jebel Ali, Dubai, transferred into different containers and loaded onto another vessel for India, with fabricated import documentation to disguise origin.
- Two breaches: the prohibition on direct or indirect import or transit of all goods originating in or exported from Pakistan under DGFT notification 06/2025-26 of 2 May 2025, issued after the Pahalgam attack; and the restriction on watermelon seeds since 1 July 2024 under DGFT notification 02/2023 of 5 April 2024.
- The consignment, worth about Rs 2.02 crore, was seized on 14 October under the Customs Act 1962; an earlier 22,000 kg muskmelon seed consignment from the same Dubai supplier in February 2026 is also in doubt.
- Those arrested are the son and nephew of the IEC holder - the son owns the Dubai supplier firm. DRI also cited over 362 tonnes of Pakistani dry dates in 13 containers at Nashik in September and 295 containers with 7,311 tonnes of Pakistani rock salt routed through Colombo in October.
For Prelims
- The prohibition: after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, India barred the direct or indirect import or transit of all goods originating in or exported from Pakistan by DGFT notification 06/2025-26 of 2 May 2025 - a trade measure taken on national security and public policy grounds, which is why it covers transit as well as import.
- Why "indirect" is the operative word: a blanket origin ban can only be evaded through a third country, so enforcement turns on rules of origin and the certificate of origin rather than on the port of loading.
- CAROTAR 2020 and Section 28DA of the Customs Act place the burden on the importer to possess origin information rather than merely a certificate, and allow customs to question or deny origin claims - the legal basis for cases like this.
- Transshipment hubs matter because cargo can legally change vessels there; Jebel Ali and Colombo handle much of India's feeder traffic, which is what makes them the route of choice for origin laundering.
- DRI is the apex anti-smuggling intelligence agency under the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, Department of Revenue - distinct from the DGFT (Department of Commerce), which issues the import policy DRI enforces.
- Import policy categories: goods are free, restricted (licence required), prohibited or canalised through State agencies under the ITC (HS) schedule; watermelon seeds moved to restricted from 1 July 2024, which is a licensing control rather than a ban.
- Penal consequences: misdeclaration of origin attracts confiscation under Section 111 and penalty under Sections 112 and 114AA of the Customs Act, and arrest where the offence is cognisable - the Act also provides for prosecution of persons concerned in the offence, which is how family members handling different legs become accused.
- India-Pakistan trade history: Pakistan withdrew India's Most Favoured Nation status in 2019 after Pulwama and India raised duties to 200 per cent; bilateral trade had already collapsed to a fraction of its level before the 2025 prohibition, which is why these cases involve niche commodities such as dry fruit, salt and seeds.
For UPSC: A precise case study in how an origin-based trade prohibition is evaded and enforced, with notification numbers attached. Deploy it on India-Pakistan relations and trade sanctions, on rules of origin and customs enforcement, and on economic security.
What it is NOT: No total for Operation Deep Manifest - three cases are described but the operation's cumulative seizure value, the number of consignments examined or importers under investigation is not given. Nothing on whether the UAE or Sri Lankan authorities were approached, which is the only durable fix for transshipment laundering, and nothing on action against the Dubai supplier firm itself. No statement of how the earlier February 2026 consignment will be dealt with, no mention of prosecution timelines, and no indication whether origin verification at import is being systematised or remains intelligence-led.
For Mains
Syllabus: GS2.17 · GS3.19 · Linkage L2
Anchor
DRI has seized about 25,000 kg of Pakistan-origin watermelon seeds routed through Jebel Ali and declared as UAE goods at Nhava Sheva, arresting two persons - the third case in two months under Operation Deep Manifest against evasion of India's prohibition on Pakistani goods.
Substantiation (data)
The consignment, worth about Rs 2.02 crore, was shipped from Karachi to Jebel Ali, transferred into different containers and reloaded for India with fabricated documentation; it breached both the blanket prohibition under DGFT notification 06/2025-26 of 2 May 2025 and the restriction on watermelon seeds since 1 July 2024. The arrested are the son and nephew of the IEC holder, the son owning the Dubai supplier firm. Earlier cases: over 362 tonnes of Pakistani dry dates at Nashik in September and 295 containers carrying 7,311 tonnes of rock salt routed through Colombo in October.
Position
The enforcement is working in the only way it can - on documents and intelligence rather than at the border. A prohibition framed on origin is unenforceable at the point of loading, because the ship arrives from Dubai or Colombo; it can only be enforced by reconstructing the cargo's history, which is what a two-container, two-vessel transfer at Jebel Ali is designed to defeat. Three cases in two months suggests a capability rather than a lucky catch.
Counterpoint
Case-by-case interception does not scale. The structural answer is origin data exchanged between customs administrations - precisely what CBIC signed with New Zealand on 19 October - and nothing here suggests such an arrangement is being sought with the UAE or Sri Lanka, whose ports are the hinge of every one of these cases. The release also gives no cumulative figure for Operation Deep Manifest, so whether the three cases are the bulk of the problem or a sample of it is unknown.
Way forward
Pursue electronic origin data exchange with the UAE and Sri Lanka, publish Operation Deep Manifest's cumulative numbers, and act against the overseas supplier entities rather than only the Indian importers. Where a commodity is both prohibited by origin and restricted by policy, risk-flag it in the customs system by default rather than waiting for intelligence.
Conclusion
A well-made case that also shows the limit of the method. The ban is a foreign policy instrument; making it stick requires the cooperation of the ports that launder around it.
Deploys into: India-Pakistan relations and trade sanctions · Rules of origin and customs enforcement · Economic security and transshipment · Third-country circumvention
Ministry of Finance · 2026-10-23 · PRID 2327627 · PIB source ↗