PIB TrackerC-DOT unveils fourteen quantum products across QKD and post-quantum crypto
The telecom R&D centre's 43rd Foundation Day series spans two quantum key distribution systems, two components and ten encryptors and nodes built on NIST post-quantum algorithms.
What happened
- C-DOT, the R&D centre of the Department of Telecommunications, unveiled 14 indigenous quantum products at its 43rd Foundation Day in New Delhi.
- Q-AKSHAY CD is a compact 1U fibre QKD system on the Coherent One Way and Differential Phase Shift protocols; Q-AKSHAY MD uses Measurement Device Independent QKD.
- C-SPD, a single-photon detector, and C-RD, a wideband RF driver for intensity and phase modulators, are the component-level products.
- Ten products use NIST post-quantum cryptography algorithms, from Q-SETU at 80 Mbps to Q-AMOGH at 200 Gbps on Layer 1.
- Q-VIKRAM and Q-PARAKRAM are defence-grade encryptors to 1 Gbps, and Q-VAJRA1000 adds quantum-safe protection to existing GPON and wireless networks.
For Prelims
- C-DOT: the Centre for Development of Telematics, the telecom R&D centre of the Department of Telecommunications, marking its 43rd Foundation Day.
- QKD: Quantum Key Distribution — keys distributed over a physical quantum channel, so interception disturbs the signal; it needs new hardware such as single-photon detectors.
- PQC: Post-Quantum Cryptography — classical algorithms believed resistant to quantum attack; C-DOT's products use NIST PQC algorithms and run on existing networks.
- COW and DPS: the Coherent One Way and Differential Phase Shift protocols used by Q-AKSHAY CD in a 1U form factor.
- MDI: the Measurement Device Independent protocol of Q-AKSHAY MD, designed against vulnerabilities in the measurement devices themselves.
- Components: C-SPD, a single-photon detector, and C-RD, a wideband RF driver for intensity and phase modulators.
- Throughput range: Q-SETU 80 Mbps at Layer 3, Q-MAHASETU 40 Gbps at Layer 2/3, Q-AMOGH 200 Gbps at Layer 1, Q-VIKRAM and Q-PARAKRAM 1 Gbps defence-grade.
- Retrofit products: Q-VACHAN, an in-line node upgrading existing IP phones, and Q-VAJRA1000, an access node securing existing GPON and wireless networks.
For UPSC: The concrete Indian answer to the quantum threat to encryption, and a rare case where the indigenous product list is specific enough to argue from. Use it on cyber security of critical infrastructure, on quantum technologies, and on indigenisation in strategic electronics.
What it is NOT: These are not quantum computers, and QKD and post-quantum cryptography are not the same thing — one distributes keys over a physical channel, the other replaces the mathematics on existing networks.
For Mains
Syllabus: GS3.18 · GS3.12 · Linkage L2
Anchor
Ten of the fourteen products are post-quantum cryptography that runs on the fibre already in the ground, and two of those exist only to upgrade equipment already installed — the quantum problem is being treated as a retrofit problem, not a rebuild.
Substantiation (data)
Fourteen products: two QKD systems (Coherent One Way and Differential Phase Shift; Measurement Device Independent), two components (a single-photon detector and a wideband RF driver) and ten NIST PQC products from 80 Mbps at Layer 3 to 200 Gbps at Layer 1, including two defence-grade encryptors at 1 Gbps.
Exemplification
Q-VACHAN is an in-line node whose only purpose is to put quantum-safe security into IP phones already on desks, and Q-VAJRA1000 does the same for GPON and wireless access networks.
Problematisation
The release announces products, not deployment: there is no figure for networks migrated, no timeline for the transition of government or banking traffic, and no policy mandating PQC adoption.
Way-forward
A published migration schedule for critical sectors would turn a product catalogue into a transition, since the risk is to traffic being carried and stored now.
Position
Sovereignty in cryptography is not established by owning the algorithms — the NIST standards are American — but by owning the boxes that implement them and the detectors and drivers inside them.
Deploys into: Cyber security + indigenisation and new technology (GS3.18, GS3.12) · quantum-safe communications, QKD versus post-quantum cryptography, and securing critical telecom infrastructure.
Ministry of Communications · 2026-08-31 · PRID 2305167 · PIB source ↗