๐Ÿ›ก Security & DefenceMAINS ยท GS3.17

Multilateral army exercise PRAGATI begins in Meghalaya

India hosts a 12-nation Indian Ocean Region land exercise at Umroi Military Station, focused on counter-terrorism in jungle terrain.

What happened

Background & context

PRAGATI sits within a wider Indian Army practice of hosting and joining named military exercises โ€” the recurring scaffolding through which India builds interoperability with friendly armies. These fall into two families: bilateral exercises (one partner country, a fixed name, usually held alternately in each country) and multilateral exercises (many armies under one banner). PRAGATI belongs to the multilateral family, and its organising idea is geographic rather than bilateral: it gathers the land forces of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) โ€” the maritime neighbourhood stretching from East Africa and the Gulf across South Asia to Southeast Asia โ€” around a shared land-warfare problem set.

The choice of Umroi, near Shillong in Meghalaya, is deliberate. The Northeast offers the semi-mountainous, heavily forested terrain in which much of the region's counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism fighting actually occurs, and the Indian Army's institutional experience in jungle warfare โ€” anchored by the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairengte, Mizoram โ€” gives India a credible curriculum to share. Hosting at Umroi also fits a longer trend of moving high-visibility military diplomacy into the Northeast, projecting the region as a gateway for India's Act East engagement rather than a sensitive periphery.

The exercise is also an instrument of India's role as a net security provider in the IOR โ€” a posture under which India offers training, capacity-building, disaster response and maritime-domain support to smaller regional states. Read alongside the Atmanirbhar Bharat showcase, PRAGATI doubles as a soft-power and defence-export platform: the same gathering that builds interoperability also puts indigenous Indian military equipment in front of a dozen prospective buyers.

The participant list itself tells a strategic story worth reading slowly. It spans three sub-regions of the Indian Ocean rim: South Asian neighbours (Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives), Southeast Asian states (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam) and an African island state (Seychelles). Several of these are countries with which India already runs dedicated bilateral army exercises โ€” for instance Surya Kiran with Nepal, Mitra Shakti with Sri Lanka and Garuda Shakti with Indonesia โ€” so PRAGATI layers a multilateral forum on top of those existing bilateral channels rather than replacing them. The absence of the larger extra-regional powers is itself part of the message: this is framed as a gathering of regional armies, organised around the shared geography of the Indian Ocean rather than around any single great-power axis.

It is useful to locate the exercise against the calendar of Indian military diplomacy in this same period. In May 2026 the Raksha Mantri held bilateral defence talks in Seoul with the Republic of Korea's defence minister, and the warship INS Sunayna returned to Kochi after the landmark IOS SAGAR deployment โ€” three distinct strands (a land exercise, ministerial diplomacy and a naval outreach mission) that together sketch how India simultaneously works the army, navy and policy levers of its Indian Ocean strategy. PRAGATI is the land-forces strand of that broader effort.

For Prelims

How it compares โ€” and what it is NOT. PRAGATI is frequently confused with India's many naval Indian-Ocean initiatives, and the distinction is the examinable point. It is NOT a naval exercise: it does not involve ships or maritime drills. In particular it is distinct from IOS SAGAR (Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR โ€” a single Indian warship, INS Sunayna, deployed across the IOR with foreign crews embarked, which returned to Kochi after a landmark deployment in the same May 2026 cycle), and from the larger MILAN multilateral naval exercise hosted by the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam, and from SAGAR as a doctrine (Security and Growth for All in the Region, India's maritime-cooperation vision). PRAGATI is the land-warfare counterpart to that maritime family โ€” armies, not navies; jungle and hill counter-terrorism, not sea lanes. It is also NOT a bilateral exercise: it gathers a dozen armies under one banner rather than pairing India with a single partner.

The fuller set it belongs to. To survive "match the pairs" and "how many of these" questions, place PRAGATI inside India's broader exercise calendar. India's recurring bilateral army exercises include, among others, Yudh Abhyas (United States), Indra (Russia), Hand-in-Hand (China), Maitree (Thailand), Mitra Shakti (Sri Lanka), Surya Kiran (Nepal), Garuda Shakti (Indonesia, with the Army), Vajra Prahar and Sampriti (Bangladesh). Multinational/multilateral exercises India joins or hosts include MILAN and Malabar (naval), and the tri-service or specialised formats. PRAGATI's specific niche โ€” an Indian-Army-hosted, IOR-wide, counter-terrorism land exercise โ€” is what makes it distinct from each of these. The triad to keep straight is the level (bilateral vs multilateral), the service (army vs navy vs air vs tri-service), and the domain (land/jungle vs maritime).

Why it matters

The problem PRAGATI addresses is concrete: terrorism and insurgency in the IOR rarely respect borders, and the armies of the region โ€” many of them smaller forces โ€” face common enemies in similar terrain without a common operating language. A two-week exercise that drills joint planning, tactical procedures and intelligence-sharing builds the interoperability that lets these armies act together when a real contingency arrives, instead of meeting for the first time in crisis. The explicit objective of an institutionalised mechanism for exchanging best practices signals that India wants this to be a durable habit of cooperation, not a one-off photo opportunity.

For India specifically, PRAGATI advances three overlapping aims. Strategically, it operationalises the net-security-provider role and deepens defence ties across South and Southeast Asia, reinforcing the Act East policy through the symbolically loaded choice of the Northeast as host. Economically, the Atmanirbhar Bharat showcase converts military diplomacy into a marketing channel for indigenous defence manufacturing, supporting the push to grow defence exports. Diplomatically, convening 12 nations in a framework of "equality, friendship and mutual respect" lets India present an inclusive, non-coercive model of regional security cooperation โ€” a contrast it is keen to draw in a contested neighbourhood. The gap the exercise quietly admits is that such cooperation has historically been ad hoc; the value-add is the move toward institutionalisation.

For Mains

Exemplification
PRAGATI 2026 is a ready example of India operationalising its self-image as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region through army-to-army cooperation, not just maritime presence โ€” useful wherever an answer needs a concrete, current instance of regional defence diplomacy.
Substantiation
Supplies hard data points โ€” a 12-nation IOR land exercise hosted at Umroi, Meghalaya, focused on counter-terrorism in jungle terrain, with indigenous equipment showcased under Atmanirbhar Bharat โ€” to back claims about the scale and direction of India's defence engagement.
Position
Illustrates the government's stated stance that regional security is best pursued through inclusive, capacity-building cooperation conducted "in the spirit of equality, friendship and mutual respect", and through indigenisation of defence production.
Problematisation
The exercise's own emphasis on building "an institutionalised mechanism" implicitly concedes the gap it addresses โ€” that regional counter-terrorism cooperation has historically been episodic and personality-driven, lacking standing structures for joint planning and intelligence-sharing among IOR land forces.
Way-forward
The move toward an institutionalised mechanism for sharing best practices and intelligence points to the way forward: converting episodic joint exercises into standing frameworks for interoperability among IOR armies, paired with continued indigenisation so cooperation is backed by Indian-made capability.
Deploys into: GS3.17 (external and internal security challenges; role of external state and non-state actors) โ€” India's counter-terrorism cooperation in the IOR; also referable to GS2.17/2.18 (India and its neighbourhood, bilateral and regional groupings) and the net-security-provider and Act East debates.
Ministry of Defence ยท 2026-05-20 ยท PRID 2263122 ยท PIB source โ†—