๐ŸŒ International RelationsMAINS ยท GS2.18

India takes BRICS chairship for the fourth time

India hosts the 2nd CGETI trade meeting at Gandhinagar as it chairs the BRICS grouping through 2026.

What happened

Background & context

BRICS is an inter-governmental grouping of major emerging economies that began as an investment-bank acronym โ€” "BRIC", coined in 2001 to describe Brazil, Russia, India and China as the large, fast-growing economies expected to reshape global output. The idea moved from analysts' shorthand to a real diplomatic forum when the four held their first formal summit at Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. South Africa joined in 2010โ€“11, turning "BRIC" into "BRICS" and giving the group an African pillar. The bloc has no founding charter and no permanent secretariat; it runs on an annual rotating chairship, a leaders' summit, and a web of sectoral working groups and ministerial tracks โ€” of which trade is one.

The grouping widened sharply at the Johannesburg summit and the 2024 Kazan summit, when several new members were admitted in an enlargement often called "BRICS-plus". Alongside the five founders, the expanded membership now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, with Indonesia also joining the expanded grouping; Saudi Arabia was invited and has been weighing full membership. The exact roster of full members versus partner-tier states has shifted edition to edition, so the safe exam anchor is the original five plus the post-2024 entrants named above. This widening is what makes the trade numbers in the present release significant: the CGETI is the standing forum where this larger membership negotiates the commercial agenda.

CGETI โ€” the Contact Group on Trade and Economic Issues โ€” is the senior-officials body that prepares the BRICS trade and economic agenda for the Trade Ministers' meeting and, ultimately, for the leaders' summit. It is where positions on World Trade Organization reform, customs cooperation, e-commerce, intellectual property and MSME support are hammered out before they rise to the ministerial and summit levels. Hosting two CGETI rounds in a single chairship year โ€” the virtual March round and now the in-person Gandhinagar round โ€” is the normal rhythm by which the chair drives the year's deliverables. India's Ministry of Commerce & Industry is the nodal ministry steering this track for the 2026 chairship.

The chairship rotates annually among members, and India's four turns trace the bloc's own evolution. Its first chairship in 2012 produced the Delhi summit, where the idea of a BRICS-led development bank was first seriously floated; that idea matured into the New Development Bank, agreed in principle by the time of the 2014 Fortaleza summit and formally established with its headquarters in Shanghai. India chaired again in 2016, hosting the Goa summit, and a third time in 2021, when it ran a largely virtual cycle during the pandemic. The 2026 chairship is therefore India's fourth lead of a bloc that has grown from four economies discussing investment prospects into a widened grouping with its own bank, a currency-swap arrangement and a standing trade-negotiation machinery.

It helps to place BRICS against a peer to see what it is and is not. Compared with the G20 โ€” the broader forum of major economies that includes both Western powers and emerging markets and works largely on macro-financial coordination โ€” BRICS is a smaller, emerging-market-only caucus that increasingly positions itself as a counterweight voice on trade and development finance. Compared with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which is security- and connectivity-focused and Eurasian in geography, BRICS is economy-led and spans four continents. And unlike a regional trade pact such as the RCEP or the European Union's single market, BRICS does not lower tariffs among its members or pool sovereignty; the CGETI coordinates positions and cooperation rather than binding members to a common commercial code.

For Prelims

For UPSC: India chairs BRICS in 2026 โ€” its 4th turn after 2012/2016/2021. The flagship data point is intra-BRICS trade rising thirteen-fold to US$1.17 trillion in 2024, yet still only ~5% of world trade. CGETI is the trade-officials body; NDB (Shanghai, 2014) and CRA are the financial pillars.
What it is NOT: BRICS is not a treaty-based organisation, a free-trade area, or a customs union โ€” there is no founding charter and no permanent secretariat, and CGETI does not negotiate a common external tariff. It is not a regional bloc (members span four continents), and it is distinct from the G7, G20, SCO and IBSA. The New Development Bank is not the same as the IMF or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank โ€” the AIIB is a separate, China-led institution. CGETI is a trade contact group, not a dispute-settlement body like the WTO's.

Why it matters

The chairship hands India the pen on the year's BRICS economic agenda at a moment when the rules-based trading order is under strain. With WTO dispute settlement weakened and tariff measures spreading among major economies, a forum of large emerging markets becomes a place to coordinate positions on multilateral-trade reform and to build commercial channels that do not run only through Western institutions. The thirteen-fold rise in intra-BRICS trade shows how much commerce the bloc has internalised; the fact that it is still only about 5% of global trade is the gap the chairship is trying to close โ€” and the reason India is pushing MSME internationalisation, services-trade expansion and resilient value chains rather than headline tariff cuts.

For India specifically, the numbers explain the stakes: US$82 billion in goods exports and US$31.3 billion in services exports to BRICS partners is a market India wants to grow and diversify, especially as it hedges against concentration in any single trading relationship. Hosting the round at Gandhinagar and taking delegates to GIFT City also signals India's pitch to route more of this trade and its financing through an Indian International Financial Services Centre โ€” tying the foreign-policy forum to a domestic economic-infrastructure ambition.

India's role inside BRICS has consistently been that of a balancer. It champions the development-finance and south-south-cooperation strands โ€” it was an early backer of the New Development Bank and holds an equal founding stake in it โ€” while resisting any drift toward an explicitly anti-Western or de-dollarisation bloc, given its parallel partnerships in the Quad, the G20 and with the West. That balancing act is visible in the 2026 trade agenda: the emphasis on MSME internationalisation and services trade plays to Indian strengths, while the stated goal of "strengthening the multilateral trading system" keeps India anchored to an open, rules-based order rather than a closed regional preference. The structural caveat to note is the bloc's internal asymmetry โ€” China's economy dwarfs the others, and unresolved India-China friction limits how far a genuinely common trade position can be pushed, which is part of why intra-BRICS trade remains modest relative to the members' global footprint.

For Mains

Anchor
India's 2026 BRICS chairship and the Gandhinagar CGETI meeting can anchor an answer on India's engagement with plurilateral economic groupings and its strategy of "multi-alignment" amid a fragmenting trade order.
Substantiation
Use the hard data โ€” intra-BRICS trade rising thirteen-fold from US$84 bn (2003) to US$1.17 trillion (2024), still ~5% of global trade, and India's US$82 bn goods / US$31.3 bn services exports to BRICS โ€” to quantify the bloc's economic weight and India's stake.
Exemplification
Cite the CGETI priorities (MSME internationalisation, resilient global value chains, services-trade expansion) as a concrete example of how India operationalises south-south economic cooperation beyond rhetoric.
Problematisation
The release itself admits the bloc captures only ~5% of global trade โ€” usable to problematise BRICS's limited commercial integration, the absence of a charter or secretariat, and the internal divergences (China's dominance, India-China tensions) that constrain a common trade stance.
Way-forward
Strengthening the multilateral trading system, building resilient value chains and deepening services trade โ€” the meeting's own agenda โ€” read directly as way-forward points for India's plurilateral economic diplomacy.
Position
India's stated stance: it chairs to reform and strengthen the multilateral trading system and to expand intra-bloc trade, not to build a closed bloc โ€” a position worth quoting to show India's preference for an open, rules-based order even inside non-Western groupings.
Deploys into: bilateral, regional and global groupings of which India is a member (GS-II); India's economic diplomacy and the reform of the multilateral trading/WTO order; south-south cooperation and the "BRICS-plus" enlargement.
Ministry of Commerce & Industry ยท 2026-05-16 ยท PRID 2261738 ยท PIB source โ†—
Related: BRICS & plurilateral groupings hub ยท International Relations ยท This week's cards