🌐 International RelationsMAINS · GS2.17

INS Sudarshini completes Cape Verde port call

The Indian Navy's sail training ship advances maritime outreach across the Atlantic on its Lokayan 26 expedition.

What happened

Background & context

A "port call" is the formal visit of a warship to a foreign port. For a navy, it is one of the cheapest and most visible instruments of diplomacy: the ship is, in effect, a piece of sovereign territory that arrives in a partner country, hosts its officials aboard, exchanges professional knowledge, and leaves a goodwill footprint without any of the cost or commitment of a base. The Mindelo stopover is one node in a longer chain of such calls strung along the route of expedition Lokayan 26.

INS Sudarshini belongs to a distinct and small category of naval assets β€” the sail training ship. Most navies retain one or two square-rigged or tall-ship sailing vessels not for combat but for officer training: cadets learn seamanship, navigation, teamwork and the discipline of working aloft on a wind-driven hull, skills that build the seafaring foundation underneath modern electronic warships. Because such ships are romantic, slow-moving and visually striking, they double as roving ambassadors β€” they draw crowds at every harbour and make ideal platforms for maritime outreach. Sudarshini sits alongside the better-known INS Tarangini (the Navy's first sail training ship) and INSV Tarini and INSV Mhadei (smaller ocean-sailing vessels used for solo and crew circumnavigation expeditions) within India's sail-training and ocean-sailing family.

The deployment also sits inside a wider pattern of Indian naval diplomacy. India describes itself as a "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean Region and, increasingly, projects presence well beyond it β€” into the Atlantic and to small island and coastal states whose own navies and coast guards are modest. Capacity-building drills with a partner coast guard, embarkation tours for a partner army, and cultural events with the local diaspora and embassy are the standard toolkit of this engagement, and Lokayan 26 is a textbook instance routed through West Africa and the Atlantic.

It helps to place the host on the map. Cape Verde β€” officially the Republic of Cabo Verde β€” is an archipelago of volcanic islands in the central Atlantic, lying off the coast of West Africa near Senegal. It is a former Portuguese colony, which is why Portuguese is its official language and why its naval ranks (CapitΓ£o-de-Navio, the rank of the Coast Guard commander Sudarshini's captain called on) and ship names (the patrol vessel Guardiao) carry Portuguese forms. As an island state, its maritime zone is vast relative to its land area, and its coast guard polices fisheries, search-and-rescue and trafficking across that expanse. An onward leg to Antigua and Barbuda β€” a small twin-island state in the eastern Caribbean β€” keeps the voyage among precisely the kind of small Atlantic and Caribbean states with which India has historically had thin defence contact, which is what makes the outreach diplomatically valuable.

A useful comparison is with India's flagship multilateral and bilateral naval events. A port call by a sail training ship sits at the gentlest end of a spectrum: at the more substantial end are bilateral exercises (such as the long-running coordinated patrols and PASSEX-type interactions India runs with partner navies), large multilateral exercises like MILAN hosted at Visakhapatnam, and overseas combatant deployments. The Sudarshini call is not in that category of combat-capable engagement; its currency is goodwill, training and presence. Reading it correctly β€” as soft power, not hard deterrence β€” is the analytical key for the exam.

For Prelims

For UPSC: INS Sudarshini is a three-masted sail training ship; its Lokayan 26 voyage, including the Mindelo (Cape Verde) port call and the onward trans-Atlantic leg to Antigua, is conducted under the Indian Navy's Bridges of Friendship outreach initiative β€” the cleanest pairing to lock in.

Why it matters

The significance of an event like this lies not in the single port call but in what it signals about Indian foreign and maritime policy. First, it extends India's naval reach beyond its home ocean. Cape Verde and Antigua are Atlantic and Caribbean nodes; a sail training ship working that route demonstrates that Indian naval diplomacy is no longer confined to the Indian Ocean rim but is consciously global, reaching small states that rarely see an Indian flag.

Second, the chosen instrument is deliberately low-threat and high-goodwill. A sail training ship arriving to run seamanship drills, host army and coast-guard delegations, and hold a Yoga session is a non-coercive, relationship-first form of presence. It builds the habit of cooperation and the personal networks among officer corps that later make harder cooperation β€” information sharing, anti-piracy coordination, hydrography β€” possible. This is the practical content of the "Bridges of Friendship" idea: friendship as the operating layer beneath security cooperation.

Third, it advances capacity building for a small-island partner. Cape Verde, like many island and coastal developing states, has a limited coast guard facing large maritime-domain challenges β€” illegal fishing, trafficking, search and rescue across a vast exclusive economic zone. Joint Damage Control and Seamanship training transfers usable skills directly to that partner's crews. This aligns India with the wider pitch of being a reliable, demand-driven security partner for the Global South rather than a transactional or extractive one. The problem it addresses, in short, is the credibility gap that every aspiring maritime power faces: presence has to be demonstrated, repeatedly and visibly, before it is believed.

For Mains

Exemplification
Use the Lokayan 26 deployment and the Cape Verde port call as a concrete, datable example of naval diplomacy and maritime soft power when a question asks for instruments through which India operationalises its "net security provider" role or its outreach to the Global South.
Substantiation
Cite the specific deliverables β€” Damage Control and Seamanship drills with the Cabo Verde Coast Guard, embarkation of a Cabo Verde Army delegation, a joint Yoga session β€” as evidence that Indian capacity-building cooperation is hands-on and skills-transferring, not merely symbolic.
Position
Present the Bridges of Friendship initiative as the stated government framing of India's naval outreach β€” relationship-first, capacity-building, non-coercive presence β€” when articulating India's declared maritime-engagement stance.
Way-forward
Argue that scaling such low-cost, high-trust deployments to Atlantic, Caribbean and small-island partners is a sustainable way to broaden India's maritime partnerships beyond the Indian Ocean Region without the cost or commitment of overseas bases.
Deploys into: GS2.17 β€” India and its neighbourhood / India's relations with regions and the Global South; maritime diplomacy, soft power, and capacity-building as tools of foreign policy (links also to the "net security provider" and Indian Ocean / blue-water strategy themes).

Source

Ministry of Defence Β· 2026-05-10 Β· PRID 2259588 Β· PIB source β†—
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