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SHANTI Act anchors India's 100 GW nuclear push

A high-level workshop on operationalising the SHANTI Act, 2025 — the law that opens nuclear power to private players on the road to a 100 GW target.

What happened

Background & context

India's civil nuclear programme has, until now, run inside a tightly closed legal box. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 reserved the production, development and use of atomic energy for the Central Government, which is why nuclear generation has been carried out almost entirely by public-sector undertakings under the DAE — chiefly the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), with Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited (BHAVINI) handling the fast-breeder line. Private and even most other public companies were locked out of owning and operating reactors. The SHANTI Act, 2025 is the legislative move that loosens this monopoly and lets private developers into the field, which is why the workshop framed the law as a turning point rather than a routine amendment.

Two structural ceilings have long held Indian nuclear capacity down. The first was capital and ownership: a handful of public utilities could not finance a tenfold capacity jump alone. The second was the liability regime created after the 2008 India–US civil nuclear deal — the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010, whose supplier-liability provisions (notably the right of recourse against equipment suppliers) made foreign and private vendors wary of the Indian market. The SHANTI Act's graded liability framework is the policy answer to that second ceiling, aiming to make participation commercially predictable without abandoning accountability for nuclear damage. The law is also to be harmonised with the Electricity Act, 2003, so that privately built nuclear plants can sell power within the same tariff, open-access and regulatory architecture that governs the rest of the grid.

The 100 GW figure is the anchor number. India's nuclear fleet has historically supplied only a small share of total electricity — on the order of roughly 8 GW of installed nuclear capacity against a total installed base of several hundred gigawatts — so a 100 GW ambition implies an order-of-magnitude expansion stretched over decades to mid-century. The workshop tied this directly to the Net Zero pledge India announced at COP26 (Glasgow) of reaching net-zero emissions by 2070: firm, dispatchable, low-carbon baseload is the gap that solar and wind alone cannot fill, and nuclear is being positioned to provide that 24/7 clean backbone.

India's home-grown nuclear effort has long been organised around a three-stage programme first set out by Homi Bhabha: Stage I uses Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) running on natural uranium; Stage II uses Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) fed by the plutonium that Stage I produces; and Stage III is meant to tap the country's vast thorium reserves through a thorium-uranium-233 cycle. This roadmap exists because India is uranium-poor but thorium-rich, holding one of the world's largest monazite-thorium reserves along its coastal sands. The fuel-security stress at the workshop — domestic capability, diversified sourcing and strategic reserves — flows from exactly this constraint, and is shaped by India being outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group while operating under the 2008 NSG waiver that lets it import uranium and reactors from countries such as Russia, France and the United States.

The reactor technologies named in the agenda place India alongside a wider global shift. Conventional reactors are large gigawatt-scale units built on site over many years; Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are factory-built units typically rated up to around 300 MWe per module, and Micro Modular Reactors (MMRs) are smaller still, in the single-digit to tens-of-MW range, suited to remote or industrial sites. The appeal is standardised, transportable construction that cuts cost and build time. India's own fleet today is anchored by indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs and by imported light-water units — most visibly the Russian-built VVERs at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu — so adding modular reactors and private builders represents a genuine widening of both who builds nuclear plants and what kind they build.

For Prelims

For UPSC: SHANTI Act, 2025 = the enabling law for the 100 GW nuclear target and the first to allow private participation in nuclear power, with a graded liability framework and harmonisation with the Electricity Act, 2003.
What it is NOT: The SHANTI Act does not repeal the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 or transfer control of fissile material and weapons-grade activity to private hands — it opens commercial power generation, not the strategic nuclear programme. It is not the same as the CLND Act, 2010 (that is the liability law it works around), and it is not a reactor or a mission — it is a statute. The 100 GW is a capacity target, not present installed capacity, which remains a small single-digit-GW share of the fleet.

Why it matters

The problem the law addresses is concrete: India's electricity demand keeps climbing while it has pledged to decarbonise, and renewables, for all their growth, are intermittent — they cannot by themselves guarantee firm power at night or through a windless week. Nuclear is one of the few large-scale, low-carbon sources that runs as steady baseload. But the old legal frame meant only a few cash-constrained public utilities could build it, and the post-2010 liability cloud kept private capital and foreign technology away. By admitting private players and softening the liability deterrent, the SHANTI Act tries to unlock the financing, the technology partnerships and the project pipeline a 100 GW build-out actually needs.

The siting and technology choices flagged at the workshop matter just as much as the ownership change. Repurposing the land, grid connections, water access and trained workforce of retiring thermal plants for new reactors is a de-risking shortcut that lowers cost and speeds approvals. And the focus on SMRs and MMRs signals a bet on smaller, factory-built, modular units that can be deployed faster and sited closer to industrial demand than conventional gigawatt-scale reactors. Together these point to a nuclear expansion that is not just bigger but differently shaped — more distributed, more private, and more tightly woven into the commercial power market.

For Mains

Anchor
A direct prompt on India's energy transition or nuclear policy can be built around the SHANTI Act, 2025 as the reform that ends the public monopoly and opens nuclear generation to private capital toward a 100 GW target.
Way-forward
In answers on Net Zero, baseload reliability or the limits of renewables, the Act supplies a concrete forward step: graded liability + SMR/MMR deployment + repurposing retiring thermal sites as the practical route to firm, low-carbon power.
Data
Use the hard markers — 100 GW capacity goal, the 2070 net-zero year, harmonisation with the Electricity Act, 2003 — to substantiate claims about the scale and design of India's clean-energy push.
Problematisation
The Act itself implies the gaps it must close: the CLND Act, 2010 supplier-liability deterrent, fuel-security dependence and diversified sourcing, financing of capital-heavy reactors, and the need for early operating rules — each a fault-line an answer can examine critically.
Deploys into: India's energy security and the renewable-vs-baseload mix · infrastructure and energy (GS3.9) · indigenisation, new and emerging technology in nuclear power (GS3.13) · government policy interventions opening strategic sectors to private capital.

Source

Ministry of Power · 2026-04-17 · PRID 2253013 · PIB source ↗
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